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# **ORGANIZING FOR REFORM**

## Global Experiences

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## Acronyms

Acronym	Full name of agency or program	Country
<b>ASI</b>	Agency for Strategic Initiatives	Russia
<b>BPS</b>	Better Public Services	New Zealand
<b>BRAP</b>	Business Reform Action Plans	India
<b>DIPP</b>	Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion	India
<b>CONAMER</b>	Comisión Nacional de Mejora Regulatoria	México
<b>CNEA</b>	Comité National de l'Environnement des Affaires	Morocco
<b>COPS</b>	Committee of Permanent Secretaries	Singapore
<b>EDB</b>	Economic Development Board	Singapore
<b>FCSA</b>	Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority	UAE
<b>KCCI</b>	Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry	South Korea
<b>MBIE</b>	Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment	New Zealand
<b>MPC</b>	Malaysia Productivity Corporation	Malaysia
<b>MITI</b>	Ministry of International Trade and Industry	Malaysia
<b>MTI</b>	Ministry of Trade and Industry	Singapore
<b>NTP</b>	National Transformation Programme	Malaysia
<b>NICMAR</b>	National Institute of Construction Management and Research	India
<b>PCNC</b>	Presidential Committee on National Competitiveness	South Korea
<b>PEP</b>	Pro-Entreprise Panel	Singapore
<b>RDB</b>	Rwanda Development Board	Rwanda

# SCOPE OF NOTE

Governments are increasingly turning their attention to the quality of the legal and regulatory environment for firms given the importance of a sound investment climate for economic growth.<sup>1</sup> While there is a growing body of research on the impact business environment reforms can have,<sup>2</sup> less is known about the way countries can organize to implement successful reform strategies.<sup>3</sup> Yet, regulatory reforms often fail to materialize not because of the change they offer, but because of a lack of coordination within government. Creating institutional mechanisms that withstand the test of time and ensuring organizational buy-in increase the likelihood of reforms to succeed.

This note looks at the experience countries have had in introducing reforms that improved the business environment. Instead of examining *what* was done (i.e. the content of reforms), the focus is placed on how reform programs came to be successful. The note aims to provide an overview of strategies and institutional mechanisms that help to (i) successfully identify and prioritize reforms, and (ii) ensure successful reform implementation. To highlight common success factors, the note relies primarily on existing case studies, conference presentations,<sup>4</sup> and the experience of the World Bank Group Indicator-Based Reform team in advising governments on their reform strategies.<sup>5</sup> By summarizing country experiences, we hope to offer a reference document with concrete examples that can be used and adapted by policymakers to address their specific challenges.

The note presents experiences of a diverse set of countries from different regions, income groups and political systems, including, but not limited to: India, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, Singapore, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. As reform programs were implemented in all the above-mentioned economies to various degrees of success, some of the key strategies and institutional structures behind the reforms are presented– as well as the specific mechanisms to make these structures work. A summary of specific country examples is included in Annex I.

Assessing the effectiveness of reform structures on economic performance is challenging – as is showing any causal evidence. The extent to which business environment reforms achieve their intended goals (e.g. employment creation, increased competitiveness, etc.) depends on multiple factors, including macroeconomic shocks. At the same time, evidence suggests that the technical design of the reforms<sup>6</sup> - in addition to existing monitoring mechanisms–have a strong role to play.

The note is divided into three sections. The first section focuses on how successful reform strategies are created. It explains how governments can identify, prioritize, implement, and monitor business environment reforms. The second part describes how action plans can be set into motion. Finally, the third section focuses on how institutional arrangements can be adapted to the local context and country capacity.

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1) World Bank. 2004. World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone. Washington DC.

2) See summary of the literature in World Bank. 2013. Doing Business in 2014: Understanding Regulations for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Washington, D.C.

3) Kikeri, Sunita, Vincent Palmade and Thomas Kenyon. 2006. Reforming the Investment Climate. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3986; Akinki, Gokhan and Peter Ladegaard. 2010. Lessons for reformers: how to launch, implement, and sustain regulatory reform - an analysis of six case studies in developing and high-income countries. Washington, DC: World Bank.; Peiffer, Caryn. 2012. Reform Coalitions: Patterns and hypotheses from a survey of the literature. The Developmental Leadership Program; Several case studies at <http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/case-studies/view-all>.

4) See reference list at the end of the note.

5) Includes former Doing Business Reform Advisory and other advisory work conducted in the context of IFC Investment Climate projects using Doing Business as a framework. Specific inputs were collected through interviews with colleagues leading reform advisory work in the following countries: Albania, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Macedonia FYR, Mauritius, Peru, Russian Federation, Rwanda and Togo.

6) Manuel, Clare. 2015. Is there a causal link between investment climate and growth? A review of the evidence. Legal Assistance for Economic Reform.

## DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL REFORM PROGRAMS

This section provides examples of how countries have gone about identifying business environment reform strategies with specific objectives and outcomes.

### Countries develop reform programs not in spite of challenges, but because of them.

While countries vary widely in terms of their demographics, income level and political systems, analyzing successful reform programs allows to identify common success factors. For a start, reformers often see a robust business environment as a necessary condition for increasing competitiveness and job creation. Historically, the urgency to reform is often triggered by an economic crisis or stagnation that brings to the forefront an economy's vulnerabilities – such as lack of diversification or innovation. Following the financial crisis, many countries reformed their regulatory environment to support economic recovery and ensure greater resilience. Other countries adopt a reform plan prior to acceding to a regional trade agreement to align some of their regulations vis-à-vis their economic partners and address relative regulatory weaknesses. Following a conflict, countries may also make regulatory reform part of a national strategy to restore confidence, both domestically and internationally.

Ultimately, there is often more than one motivating factor for countries to address and improve competitiveness. Several drivers exist, and a combination of these provide the impetus behind a reform program on business regulations (see Box 1).

#### Box 1: What drives reforms?

Motivating factors for embarking on business environment reforms vary by country. In general, they fall under one of the following categories:

**Sustain and deepen economic growth through structural change.** Reforms can be triggered by a desire to diversify the economy, increase productivity and create employment. One such example is Saudi Arabia, which under the *Saudi Vision 2030* aims to reduce oil dependency and diversify the economy. Initiatives to meet this objective include increasing the accountability and effectiveness of public institutions, as well improving regulations for businesses. Since the *Saudi Vision 2030* was launched in 2016, several reforms have been recorded by *Doing Business*. Among other areas, these reforms have facilitated trade and strengthened corporate governance.

**Restoring economic activity after a conflict or political instability.** Conflict can undermine international and domestic confidence in an economy. The end of a conflict or a period of political instability can, therefore, motivate governments to launch a business environment reform program to relaunch the economy and mobilize investment. Rwanda did this following the civil war in the 1990s – it started a series of sweeping legal and administrative changes to overhaul the business environment. The country has been able to sustain the effort over the years. Firm density has been consistently increasing and FDI inflow (% of GDP) today is among the highest in all of Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>7</sup>

7) According to IMF data, Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) in Rwanda in 2017 was 3.21 % compared to 1.47 % on average for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**External shocks and economic crisis:** Governments often embark on regulatory reforms to restore growth following an economic crisis. Portugal introduced wide-ranging reforms following the financial crisis of 2008, in part with EU and IMF financial support. These included reforms in tax policy and administration, labor regulations, business licenses and permits, contract enforcement, and property registration.<sup>8</sup>

**Membership to a regional or international organization:** Membership in a regional organization or the prospect of joining one is another driver for reforming the regulatory environment for businesses. For example, gaining EU accession has anchored a sustained reform program in Macedonia FYR. Countries like Poland and the Czech Republic have continued adjusting their legal and regulatory frameworks to the EU directives and enacting reforms to increase competitiveness. In countries like Costa Rica or Peru, the prospect of OECD membership has been one of the motivating factors for reforms.

**Trade agreements:** Plans to join a free-trade zone can incentivize regulatory reforms, while actual membership can give an impetus for implementing a sustained reform program due to increased competitive pressures. Entering the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with two highly developed economies in 1994 acted as a commitment mechanism for Mexico, ensuring the continuation of the reform process—especially in areas like competition policy, and property rights.<sup>9</sup>

**Accessing finance from development partners:** In countries like Togo, accessing funding from development partners such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation motivated business environment reforms. With this objective in mind, Togo implemented the second highest number of reforms in West Africa from 2014 to 2018 according to *Doing Business*, behind only Senegal.

## Effective reform programs are linked to a broader development agenda.

Business reform programs are most effective if they are intertwined with a national development agenda – and a long-term strategic vision for the country. This gives business reform programs a *raison d'être*, in addition to visibility and coherence. Binding commitments to the public also facilitate institutional cooperation and cross-party political agreement.<sup>10</sup>

Key to anchoring such a vision is to aim for a tangible development outcome, such as graduating from one income group to another, or economic diversification. Rwanda, for instance, launched its *Vision 2020* in 2000, which aims to transform the country from a low-income economy to a lower-middle-income economy.<sup>11</sup> One of its six pillars focuses on private sector-led development. Similarly, Mauritius celebrated its 50<sup>th</sup> year of independence in 2018 by voicing its objective to achieve the status of a high-income economy by 2025 through several programs, including improvement of the regulatory framework for businesses. In 2010, the UAE launched *UAE Vision 2021* which calls for a shift from an oil dependent economy to a diversified and knowledge-based economy. One of the six pillars of the national agenda is the “competitive knowledge economy”. It focuses on boosting innovation and entrepreneurship through private sector development measures.

But integrating business reforms into a national development agenda (or vision) is not enough. Short- and medium-term objectives need to be defined to achieve the stated overarching national goal and allow for readjustments in case of unforeseen circumstances. Malaysia broke down a thirty-year vision into 5-year economic plans (see box 2). Ultimately, business reform plans need to revolve around short, medium and long term measurable outcomes to continuously monitor progress and maintain flexibility if needed.<sup>12</sup>

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8) World Bank Group, Business Reforms count: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reforms/Overview/Economy/portugal>

9) Kose, Ayhan, Guy Meredith, and Christopher Towe. 2004. How has Nafta affected the Mexican economy? Review and evidence. IMF Working Paper.

10) World Bank National Visions Matter: Lessons of success. Proceedings of a public private sector development Forum. July 2004.

11) The objective has now been revised to 2035.


12) Brady, D. & M. Spence (2010) Leadership and Politics: A Perspective from the Commission on Growth and Development. In D. Brady and M. Spence (Eds.) Leadership and Growth. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1-17.

## Box 2: How does Malaysia structure its business reform program around its national vision?

In Malaysia, the federal government has historically taken a proactive role in economic and development reforms. The current long-term plan adopted in 1991 aims to make Malaysia a high-income country by 2020. To achieve this long-term objective, Malaysia has had a series of five-year economic plans, where actions are identified, which include business regulatory reforms. These economic plans give the government flexibility to adapt to unforeseen changes in the economic landscape, such as the Asian Financial Crisis which caused considerable macroeconomic shocks, while also keeping the long-term objective laid out by the *Vision 2020*.

Each economic plan<sup>13</sup> is oriented toward results, with clearly defined targets that are “Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound (SMART)”. Historically, key performance indicators are agreed upon as part of the economic plan so implementers, planners and evaluators are all clear on what will be monitored and evaluated. Since 2016, monitoring is also harmonized through the “Guidelines in Conducting Development Program Evaluation”, which provides a methodology for evaluating the outcomes of programs.

**Figure 1: Malaysia’s planning timeline**



Source: Government of Malaysia.

## Action plans revolve around measurable outcomes.

Successful reform programs focus on outputs and outcomes, rather than inputs. Outcome monitoring and evaluation, in turn, improve the quality of future development plans as the impact of previous programs can be examined. Reform action plans take the form of a time-bound roadmap where objectives are listed, along with measurable outcomes, to determine success.

New Zealand, for example, created a private sector development plan centered around outcomes. The country introduced in 2012 the *Better Public Services* (BPS) program, which - as its names suggests - focused on improving government services. Among the 10 cross-agency objectives of the BPS was boosting e-services for businesses through targeted initiatives, including the creation of an online one-stop shop for firms. To gauge success, two desired outcomes were identified through the 2012-2017 period: (i) to reduce the business costs from dealing with the government by 25%; and (ii) align government to business services ratings with leading private sector firms’ performance.


13) The 11th Plan envisages six strategic thrusts: 1. enhancing inclusiveness towards an equitable society, 2. improving well-being for all, 3. accelerating human capital development for an advanced nation, 4. pursuing green growth for sustainability and resilience, 5. strengthening infrastructure to support economic expansion, and 6. re-engineering economic growth for greater prosperity. Each of these strategic thrusts have several focus areas, which themselves have clear targets with specific indicators to measure whether the strategies employed are achieving the strategic goals. For instance, one focus area under the first strategic thrust is lifting B40 households (the poorest 40 percent of the population) towards the middle class of society. This focus area has two measurable targets: increasing the average and median levels of monthly household income to RM 5,270 (US\$1,212) and RM 5,701 (US\$1,311) respectively by 2020, doubling them from their levels in 2014.

Some countries use international benchmarks for outcome monitoring, including performance in international indices such as the World Bank's *Doing Business* report. In Sri Lanka, for example, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe announced his intention in 2016 to improve Sri Lanka's investment climate and reach the Top 70 on the *Doing Business* Index by 2020. While such objectives based on international benchmarks can be a force for change and catalyze government action, the potential pitfall is that rankings are always relative to the performance of other countries and, therefore, not fully under the control of policymakers. Generally speaking, competitiveness rankings can help countries achieve long-term objectives, but it is best if they are not an end-goal.

Rwanda is another example of an economy that used *Doing Business* as a guide to improving its business environment. Starting in 2007, Rwanda, under the first *Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy*, started using *Doing Business* to (i) learn from global good practices in business regulation and (ii) monitor improvements in the country's regulatory framework. In 2009, the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) was created (inspired by the Singaporean model) to help oversee the country's business regulations, foreign investments, and broader development planning.

Each year, the RDB aims to increase investment commitments and FDI through multiple initiatives, including improving its regulatory framework. With this objective in mind, Rwanda implemented 47 reforms impacting the full lifecycle of a firm from 2009 (*Doing Business 2010*) to 2018 (*Doing Business 2019*). Coincidentally, new business density during that time more than quadrupled (figure 3). A study also found that regulation reforms resulted in cost savings for the private sector estimated at \$5 million, investments totaling \$45 million and about 15,000 jobs.<sup>14</sup>

**Figure 2. A timeline of Rwanda's business reform successes**



Source: *Doing Business* data. World Bank Entrepreneurship database.

### Priorities identified by the private sector must take center stage.

Business regulatory reforms have limited impact if the targeted outcomes do not benefit firms. As the private sector is not homogeneous and various sectors in the economy can have competing interests and priorities, it is important for the different organizations and associations representing businesses to coalesce around a common strategy.<sup>15</sup> Engagement between the private sector and public officials can, therefore, help determine key reform priorities.

14) *Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency*

15) World Bank National Visions Matter: Lessons of success. Proceedings of a public private sector development Forum. July 2004.

Setting the business reform agenda can follow a “top-down” or “bottom-up” process. The latter has the benefit of directly incorporating the concerns and priorities of the private sector into policies. Indeed, early consultation with the private sector allows for a better understanding of the barriers firms face. Singapore, for example, actively engages the private sector to identify regulatory shortcomings and potential policy improvements through its Pro-Entreprise Panel (PEP). The public-private panel serves as a feedback and troubleshooting platform when new policies and public initiatives are tested and rolled out. Businesses can also report to PEP regulatory problems as well as issues relating to red tape and public service performance.

In Malaysia, the private sector is also actively engaged in policy problem-solving. Feedback from firms on policy matters is encouraged through the online portal of PEMUDAH, a special task force to facilitate business. At the same time, the private sector is engaged in matters of policy design. For example, PEMANDU, a dedicated delivery unit, introduced “Labs” to determine strategic priorities and support reform implementation for the new government in 2009. The Labs bring together relevant public and private sector stakeholders from their field of competence to identify bottlenecks for firms along with potential solutions. Each lab had access to statistics and data analysis.

In New Zealand, where the government is relatively small<sup>16</sup> and there is strong culture of transparency,<sup>17</sup> the policy-making process by design is informed by business groups and private sector committees. Public servants are required to build a network of trusted advisors to gather feedback on policies so that proposals have a large consensus and answer the needs of the business community. At the same time, private sector councils and associations - such as Business New Zealand - are asked to regularly weigh-in on business regulation matters to the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE), which oversees policy, regulation, and services impacting local firms. Such consultations have guided policy design. For example, after businesses complained that government services were fragmented in 2012, the government set up an online portal to provide all the advice and support business’s needs.

In Mauritius, the private sector has been the major force driving the reform agenda through Business Mauritius, an umbrella organization of sector-specific business associations, fully independent from government. Business Mauritius represents over 1,200 local businesses and meets regularly with the Prime Minister and formulates policy reform proposals. Its members also meet separately with different line ministries.

In the UK, systematic consultation with the private sector is achieved through the Business Advisory Board. This public-private dialogue mechanism involves tri-annual meetings with approximately 100 business organizations representing over 750,000 members. In addition, the UK uses the Business Perceptions Survey to assess the regulatory environment. This regular survey has been undertaken 9 times since its creation in 2007 and uses a statistically significant sample.<sup>18</sup> The results are then used to determine priorities, frame policy decisions and conduct impact assessments. Finally, the UK government regularly requests feedback from businesses through open platforms. For example, the *Red Tape Challenge*, from 2011 to 2013, invited the public to comment through a website on 21,000 active statutory rules and regulations. Thanks to this initiative, three thousand regulations were earmarked as unnecessary or in need to be improved.<sup>19</sup>

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16) The New Zealand public sector employs around 353,500 people (SSC – June 2016), about 14.4% of the country’s total workforce. The State sector employs around 300,000 people and local government have around 53,500 employees. For more information, see <http://www.ssc.govt.nz/public-service-workforce-data/hrc-workforce>

17) The general rule governing transparency in the New Zealand government is that “everything is deemed public unless it has to be private”. Agencies at every level are subject to strong transparency and reporting requirements - which provide incentives for good governance. For instance, the cabinet papers - which inform the government’s decisions - are published online - providing the businesses with the rationale and justifications behind each policy.

18) 2,001 businesses were sampled in 2018 as part of the Business Perceptions Survey.

19) World Bank. 2012. United Kingdom: Rethinking Regulation. Washington, D.C. <http://www.doingbusiness.org/~media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Reforms/Case-Studies/2011/DB12-Case-Studies-UK.pdf>

## SETTING ACTION PLANS INTO MOTION

A well-articulated agenda is the first determinant of the success of a business reform program. Once goals have been identified through private-public dialogue, buy-in from all relevant agencies of governments is essential for setting an action plan into motion. This buy-in is typically enabled by a combination of political leadership and accountability for results at all levels of government.

### High-level leadership promotes a reform agenda.

Political support for change, and the leadership to build reform coalitions are key for reform implementation.<sup>20</sup> A strong commitment from the highest levels of government is an important ingredient to achieve inter-agency coordination and bringing about the consensus to advance economic reform.<sup>21</sup>

Successful reformers often make a public commitment at the highest political level<sup>22</sup>, as the executive branch of government understands the link between the business environment reform program and economic priorities such as job creation, export growth, and economic diversification. Often times, a clear champion can be identified—e.g. the President or Prime Minister—with ownership of the reform agenda and the determination to see it implemented. These champions personally and publicly commit to achieving specific goals and mobilize support from stakeholders inside and outside of government to ensure the reforms move forward.

Institutions championing business regulation need the necessary political capital to propose policy reforms, particularly if the reforms are bold and disruptive. One way to do this is to give them access to the country's leadership. In Russia, the Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI) provides business reform roadmaps directly to the Ministry of Economic Development (see box 3). In Singapore, the Economic Development Board (EDB) also has direct access to the Prime Minister. This is important because EDB has the mandate to test new policy ideas with the business community and provide feedback on the country's competitiveness. At the same time, EDB is placed under the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) and cannot mandate other agencies. Given its role, it is vital for EDB to be shielded from any conflict of interest when framing policy recommendations.

#### Box 3: How was ASI able to boost Russia's standing on *Doing Business*?

Prior to 2010, Russia made several attempts to curb red-tape and enhance the business environment. These attempts underlined a real need for business regulatory reforms— as Russia lagged many countries on international benchmarks related to competitiveness.<sup>23</sup> And while reform programs were often advertised by high level members of governments<sup>24</sup>, attempts failed due to (i) a lack of private sector involvement and (ii) no accountability structure within government institutions. This changed in 2011, when the government created the Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI).

20) Pfeiffer, Caryn, 2012. Reform Coalitions: Patterns and hypothesis from a Survey of the Literature. Developmental Leadership Program.

21) Brady, D., & Spence, M. 2009. "Leadership and Politics: A Perspective from the Growth Commission. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 25(2), 205-218.

22) The role of leaders in economic growth has been studied in the literature, see for example Jones, B. F., and B. A. Olken. 2005. "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II." Quarterly Journal of Economics 120: 835–64; Rotberg, Robert. 2012. Transformative Leadership: Making a Difference in the Developing World. Chicago: The Chicago University Press.

23) For example, Russia's ranking on the Doing Business 2010 report, covering 2008/09 was 120th.


24) As an example, President Medvedev in 2008 released a national plan to fight red tape: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-corruption/medvedev-starts-corruption-battle-with-new-plan-idUSL135724020080801>

Among other goals, ASI is tasked to help determine the country's business reform agenda. It does this by developing roadmaps designed during stakeholder meetings, which include public officials, representatives from think tanks and academia, business associations and firms. In addition, the process of designing the road maps is open to the public: materials and meetings recordings are made publicly available on ASI's website and the public can submit comments.

The agency presents its findings (and sends its roadmaps) to the Ministry of Economic Development. Moreover, the agency reports on a quarterly basis to the Supervisory Council, which the President heads. To keep a degree of autonomy – and shield the agency from any conflicts of interest – ASI is run as a non-profit and autonomous organization. The supervisory board includes CEOs, governors, ministers, trade and union leaders' associations and the president himself.

This participatory process – as well as the influence and political clout ASI yields - is credited with helping Russia boost its results in the *Doing Business* rankings in recent years.

**Figure 3. ASI's unique reporting structure and mission helped Russia markedly improve its standing on the ease of *Doing Business***



Source: *Doing Business* data and WB staff notes.

### Accountability is the glue that ties commitments to results.

Achieving goals and respecting deadlines requires accountability. Many countries' action plans clearly designate responsibilities for this purpose. Generally, accountability for business environment reforms works through an administration's own hierarchy, with the head of state following progress periodically (Table 1). For example, the President signs performance contracts with line Ministries and District authorities detailing the entity's specific targets.<sup>25</sup> Such oversight ensures that the reform plan trickles down through a 'chain of command'.

25) Versailles, Bruno. 2012. Performance Contracts: Imihigo. Overseas Development Institute. Budget Strengthening Initiative. Country Learning Notes. <http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/1349767/18085928/1336475381627/Rwanda+performance+contracts.pdf?token=1EcBPzADhJ8JAhY8AiuNkt5EWFw%3D>

**Table 1. Overview of high-level reporting across countries**

Country	Malaysia	Mauritius	Russian Federation	Rwanda	Turkey
<b>High-level reporting to:</b>	Prime Minister (via PEMUDAH)	Prime Minister (via meetings with Business Mauritius)	President (via Supervisory Committee of ASI)	President and Prime Minister (via Inter-Ministerial Committee/ Cabinet meetings)	Prime Minister (via high-level advisory body)
<b>Periodicity of reporting:</b>	Bi-annual and as needed	Bi-annual or as needed	Quarterly	Ongoing	Annual

Source: Authors based on references listed in Annex II and WBG staff interviews.

Periodical monitoring and reports foster accountability as it shows the progress achieved. In Korea, the Presidential Council on National Competitiveness (PCNC) – which operated under President Lee Myung-bak – used to publish an annual report with an assessment of the country’s competitiveness and the Council’s activities, policy recommendations, and business survey results.

Engaging the private sector in reform implementation provides additional dimensions of accountability. It creates expectations by the private sector that their issues will be addressed, increasing pressure to show results. For example, *Business Mauritius* actively contributes to policy formulation by way of various submissions to government (e.g. survey, statistics, annual memoranda, etc.). It also reports directly to the businesses that submit issues to close the feedback loop.

Accountability through private sector engagement has also been used in India. The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) set up an institutionalized feedback process on policy reform by commissioning public-private agencies to serve as observers and collect feedback from the private sector. These observers include the Indian Institute for Foreign Trade, the Institute of Company Secretaries of India, the National Institute of Construction Management and Research (NICMAR), and the Institute of Chartered Accountants. DIPP further set up *Doing Business* indicator-specific Task Forces in 2016 composed of representatives from relevant departments, which are required to hold regular meetings with private stakeholders to gather feedback from users on the reforms being implemented.

Regular meetings between the agencies championing reforms and high-level members of the government also increase accountability. In Singapore, the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (COPS) – which is the highest non-political oversight body of the government – holds an annual meeting specifically dedicated to the ease of *Doing Business* agenda during which each agency must propose reform actions and an improvement plan.

## Institutionalized reform mechanisms are more likely to withstand the test of time.

By design, some reforms take time to adopt. For example, the complexity of the legislature may make it time-consuming to amend laws. Modernizing institutions and the way they interact with users can also require significant investments. Therefore, it is important to set up sustainable mechanisms that withstand political changes.

Policies that institutionalize regulatory reforms can provide a basis for continuous improvement of business regulations.<sup>26</sup> The extent to which such mechanisms need to be formalized, however, varies. New Zealand's multiparty system and proportional allocation of parliamentary seats ensure continuity and incrementalism in the reform efforts. Such continuity – along with the strategic thinking it creates – is more difficult to achieve elsewhere, unless the necessary dispositions are taken to separate the political leaders from the administrative bodies.

To formalize the mandate of the institutional mechanisms and structures put in place to drive a reform agenda, governments can use various legal instruments. The legal instruments for establishing these reform structures are often decrees or circulars that originate from the Executive, but rarely laws from the legislative branch. Unlike laws, decrees and circulars allow for quick set-up of the reform structures and are easily amendable. Since such texts are often issued by the Prime Minister or the President, they formalize the commitment at the top-level of government, and rally the various agencies and stakeholders behind the reform agenda. For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued an Executive Order<sup>27</sup> to formalize and codify his commitment to launch reform initiatives – with ASI – to increase Russia's standing in the World Bank's ease of *Doing Business* index.

In addition to formalizing high-level commitments, decrees and circulars can include Terms of Reference (ToR) describing the role and functions of the various entities<sup>28</sup> of the reform structures to ensure accountability and commitment to implementation from all involved stakeholders. The level of detail in the TORs varies by country – and the precision of the TORs is hardly predictive of the level of success of the reform committees. In Morocco, the decree establishing the *Comité national de l'environnement des affaires* (CNEA)<sup>29</sup> describes the main structures of the committees but leaves to an internal charter the task of setting the committee's processes and rules. In India, the circular<sup>30</sup> that created the committee for reforming the regulatory environment for doing business clearly describes the expected deliverables and sets deadlines.

Another way to anchor the reform effort through time is for countries to separate mechanisms from shifts in political power. In many European countries, the regulatory reform agenda is informed by non-governmental actors. Permanent administrative bodies directly evaluate the impact of new and existing regulations on economic and social outcomes. For example, the UK's Office for Product Safety and Standards (formerly the Regulatory Delivery)<sup>31</sup> helps ministries deliver regulation that benefits both citizens and firms.

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26) For example, Malaysia has built on the efforts to reduce red tape led by PEMUDAH to develop a National Policy on the Development and Implementation of Regulations. OECD. 2015. *Implementing good regulatory practices in Malaysia*. Available at <http://www.oecd.org/regreform/implementing-good-regulatory-practice-in-malaysia-9789264230620-en.htm>

27) Executive Order on Long-term State Economic Policy, May 7, 2012

28) Steering committee, technical working groups, coordinating committee or secretariat.

29) Decree n. 2-10-259 – October 29, 2010.

30) General Circular n.26/2012 – Ministry of Corporate Affairs

31) Merger of the Better Regulation Delivery Office (BRDO) and the National Measurement and Regulation Office (NMRO) in March 2016.

## Fostering competition at the subnational level to achieve regulatory reform objectives.

In federal states, the central government often sets out general legislation and leaves it to the subnational government to implement it, considering varying regional circumstances. In these countries, the political party system may influence the effectiveness of coordination between different levels of government. In countries where there is one party that dominates the political arena – such as it has historically been the case in modern South Africa– intergovernmental issues are usually sorted through party channels. In federal countries where different parties dominate at different government levels (e.g. Canada, Australia and more recently India), formal intergovernmental processes and institutions are vital. Without such processes, negotiating cooperative arrangements and coordination between the different levels of government is almost impossible.

One tactic used by India is to benchmark the performance of different states against each other. The central government follows this tactic through a series of annual goals as part of its *Business Reform Action Plans (BRAP)*. The implementation of reform actions is monitored through an online portal on which state governments upload evidence of implementation (for review and approval by the central government).<sup>32</sup> Once approved, states receive an “implementation score” which allows the central government to rank states annually on reform implementation progress, as well as in real time through the portal. Reforms envisioned in the BRAP that have materialized include the streamlining and automation of over 40 state-level licenses and permits; risk-based classifications and inspections reforms; greater access to information; single window systems for business registration; and dedicated commercial benches or courts.

Mexico offers another example of how to leverage competition between states to promote a national reform agenda, championed locally by the *Comisión Nacional de Mejora Regulatoria (CONAMER)*. The federal government used to foster competition for economic growth by creating the so-called Fondo PYME. It offered financing opportunities in strategic sectors to promote economic growth, productivity and innovation. Every year, calls for proposals were advertised online. The funds of the different programs could be accessed not only by private firms, but also by state governments, municipal governments, and the judiciary. For instance, Program 1 of 2017 called support for regulatory improvement projects at the three levels of government with the objectives to: facilitate regulatory compliance, transit to formality, reduce costs, time and cumbersome procedures for the operation of companies; and increase economic competition and generate clear rules and simple procedures to ensure the compliance with contracts.

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32) <http://eodb.dipp.gov.in/>

# SUCCESSFUL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS SHARE COMMONALITIES - BUT HAVE TO BE ADAPTED TO THE LOCAL CONTEXT

As political systems vary, certain strategies and institutional arrangements work better than others depending on the local context of a country. For example, in a decentralized federal political system, engaging stakeholders can be challenging as governments need to build coalitions through various strategies.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, a strong personal commitment by a high-level political figure tends to be more effective where power is centralized - such as in Rwanda.

While institutional mechanisms need not follow one template, many of the top improvers on the World Bank ease of *Doing Business* credit the success of their reform plan to a dedicated taskforce leading the design and implementation of reforms (see Box 4). This section aims to present some of the commonalities (and differences) of successful institutional arrangements, along with their main functions.

## Box 4: Championed reforms through a dedicated body; the case of Malaysia, South Korea, Russia, and Rwanda

Malaysia, South Korea, Russia, and Rwanda implemented numerous investment climate reforms over the past decade. Among their respective income groups and region, the countries recorded some of the biggest improvements on the ease of *Doing Business*. And while the countries have little in common, a shared success factor was the designation (or creation) of a body to champion a national reform effort, from design to implementation and monitoring:

**South Korea:** under the leadership of President Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013), South Korea rose from the 22nd rank in 2008 the *Doing Business* report to the 8th rank in 2012. This was the result of efforts by the Presidential Council on Competitiveness (PCNC), which promoted ambitious reforms in several areas of business regulation, including taxation, trade, investor protections, bankruptcy, and business registration.

**Malaysia:** in 2010, the *Economic Transformation Program* was launched. Using the *Doing Business* report as a benchmark, numerous regulatory reforms were identified by the special task force to facilitate business, PEMUDAH. A dedicated delivery unit, PEMANDU, was also created to accelerate the implementation of reforms.<sup>34</sup> Through a public-private dialogue, several reforms were achieved as the country saw its ranking improve, from 23<sup>rd</sup> in 2010 to 15<sup>th</sup> in 2018. During this time, an electronic one-stop shop for business registration was launched, which contributed to shorter times to start a business and register property.

**Russia:** in 2011, the publicly funded Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI) was created and tasked by the federal government to design and monitor the country's reform effort, overseeing a wide-ranging reform

33) These strategies include reframing proposals, managing pay-offs, marginalizing opponents, etc. For more, see Francis Fukuyama, who co-founded the Leadership Academy for Development - <http://leadfordev.org/event/how-bring-about-policy-reform>.

34) Pemandu was first set up in 2009 as a unit under the Prime Minister's Department with the task of developing the National Transformation Programme (NTP) and to coordinate its implementation. In 2017, Pemandu became a private consultancy but it has contract to do consultancy work for the Government until 2019.

program that allowed the country to jump from the 123<sup>rd</sup> position in the *Doing Business 2011* report to the 31<sup>st</sup> rank in 2018. According to a 2015 firm survey in Russia, 478 of the 634 actions included in the wide-ranging roadmap were fully implemented and 70 were in the process of implementation.

**Rwanda:** starting in the late 2000s, the country introduced a series of legal, institutional, and administrative reforms to improve the business environment and attract foreign direct investment, significantly reducing the hurdles to start a business. Coordinated by the Rwanda Development Board - and supported by high-level oversight mechanisms - the reforms may have contributed to an increase in the number of registered firms, which increased by 24 percent between 2011 and 2014. The above-mentioned reform program also helped Rwanda's ease of *Doing Business* ranking, which markedly improved from 67<sup>th</sup> in 2010 to 29<sup>th</sup> in 2018.

### Setting up technical working groups, high-level oversight, and a coordinating unit to include all relevant stakeholders.

Regulatory reform programs span a wide range of areas, requiring the involvement of multiple agencies through various degrees of institutionalization. Effective reform structures, therefore, tend to be inclusive—involving all relevant public agencies and private sector representatives—to ensure coordination and information flow. Key stakeholders should be able to report issues as they arise, as chances for successful reform are increased when the process is closely monitored and focused on problem-solving.<sup>35</sup>

Table 2 provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of different institutional mechanisms in five countries. Overall, the roles are similar. (i) Technical working groups identify the constraints businesses face and develop solutions. (ii) High-level oversight committees or public-private councils prioritize the reform agenda and maintain reform momentum. (iii) Finally, a dedicated team is designated to lead the coordination of the overall reform efforts. While many countries have successfully reformed their business environment with this three-tiered structure, there are differences regarding the role of the coordinating unit, which in some countries plays a more active role in supporting reform implementation.

**Table 2. Comparison of the roles of different reform structures**

	Working groups	High-level oversight	Coordinating unit
<b>Malaysia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification of key constraints</li> <li>• Clarify responsibilities and timelines</li> <li>• Identify solutions and response formulation</li> <li>• Day to day oversight</li> <li>• Reform implementation support</li> <li>• Collect stakeholders' feedback</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Prioritization of reforms</li> <li>- Monitoring of results</li> <li>- Unblocking implementation with Prime Minister</li> </ul>	<p><b>Malaysia Productivity Corporation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coordination of reforms</li> <li>- Reform implementation support</li> <li>- Escalating implementation support</li> </ul>

35) Andrews, M. (2013). *Explaining positive deviance in public sector reforms in development*. CID Working paper no. 267.

<b>Mauritius</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification of key constraints</li> <li>• Identify solutions and response formulation</li> <li>• Day to day oversight</li> <li>• Reform implementation support</li> <li>• Escalating implementation issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prioritization of reforms</li> <li>• Unblocking implementation with Prime Minister</li> <li>• Provide stakeholders' feedback</li> </ul>	<b>Board of Investment</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clarify responsibilities and timelines</li> <li>• Coordination of reforms</li> <li>• Monitoring of results</li> <li>• Reform implementation support</li> </ul>
<b>Russia</b>	<b>ASI</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification of key constraints</li> <li>• Identify solutions and response formulation</li> <li>• Day to day oversight</li> <li>• Reform implementation support</li> <li>• Collect stakeholder feedback</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prioritization of reforms</li> <li>• Clarify responsibilities and timelines</li> <li>• Monitoring results</li> <li>• Unblocking implementation with President</li> </ul>	<b>Ministry of Economic Development</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prioritization of reforms</li> <li>• Identify solutions/response formulation</li> <li>• Escalating implementation issues</li> </ul>
<b>Rwanda</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Day to day oversight</li> <li>• Reform implementation support</li> <li>• Collect stakeholder feedback</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prioritization of reforms</li> <li>• Monitoring results</li> <li>• Unblocking implementation with Prime Minister</li> </ul>	<b>Rwanda Development Board</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification of key constraints</li> <li>• Clarify responsibilities and timelines</li> <li>• Identify solutions and response formulation</li> <li>• Coordination of reforms</li> <li>• Monitoring of results</li> <li>• Reform implementation support</li> <li>• Escalating implementation issues</li> </ul>
<b>Turkey</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification of key constraints</li> <li>• Identify solutions/response formulation</li> <li>• Reform implementation support</li> <li>• Escalating implementation issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prioritization of reforms</li> <li>• Clarify responsibilities and timelines</li> <li>• Monitoring results</li> <li>• Collect stakeholder feedback</li> <li>• Unblocking implementation with Prime Minister</li> </ul>	<b>YOIKK Secretariat</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Day to day oversight</li> <li>• Coordination of reforms</li> <li>• Monitoring of results</li> </ul>

Source: Authors, based on references listed in Annex II and interviews with WBG staff.

(i) **Technical working groups:** technical working groups focus on a specific area or sector, analyze problems, identify feasible solutions, develop detailed roadmaps and monitor reform progress. The most successful technical committees have representatives from all key agencies involved in an area, as well as knowledgeable members of the private sector. Experience suggests that their effectiveness depends on the group's leadership, its specific mandate and accountability mechanisms, the frequency of meetings, and the influence of the group's members on implementation. Generally, working groups are chaired by high-level officials. In some cases, initial working groups organized around the areas of business regulation covered in the *Doing Business* report, although the focus extends beyond the specific parameters measured by the indicators. For example, in Malaysia, the working groups span a range of issues, which are defined based on the priorities identified by PEMUDAH (Figure 5).

**Figure 5. Structure of working groups under PEMUDAH**



Source: Government of Malaysia.

(ii) **High-level oversight:** the importance of oversight of the reform process cannot be underestimated. A study of five countries that achieved sustained economic progress over the last 30 years concluded that relying on a small, dedicated team with direct access to the top government was a common feature of their reform strategies.<sup>36</sup> The advantage of these structures is that they are embedded in the policy process, yet at the same time are relieved of daily administrative matters. Therefore, they are in an ideal position to suggest actions to the national leadership and monitor their progress.<sup>37</sup>

(iii) **Coordinating unit:** having an agency or secretariat coordinating the reform effort is a common feature among reforming countries. Their role often includes analyzing the country’s business environment, making reform proposals, accompanying implementation, and reporting on progress. Oftentimes, the agency in charge of coordinating the reform effort has the mandate to promote investment, support SMEs and/or improve the business environment. In Turkey, the Ministry of Economy plays that role, whereas it is the Ministry of Economic Development in the Russian Federation. In some countries, coordinating agencies may not have the specific competencies over all areas of business regulation and may need to rely on line ministries, such as Finance and Justice, to implement reforms. In other economies, coordinating units are also used to resolve potential disputes.<sup>38</sup>

### Creating institutional mechanisms through existing institutions.

The coordination mechanisms between reform units, working groups, governments, and the private sector change from one country to another. Notably, the degree to which the bodies driving the reform process are embedded in existing government structures varies. Some countries chose to create new institutions, while others rely on existing institutions and ad-hoc committees.

36) Criscuolo, Alberto and Vincent Palmade. 2008. Reform Teams. Public Policy for the Private Sector. Note Number 318. World Bank Group. Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency. The countries are Botswana, Cape Verde, Malaysia, Mauritius and Taiwan (China).

37) These structures are particularly important in countries that need to leverage scarce technocratic expertise and maximize policy formulation and implementation.

38) For example, the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (COPS) in Singapore deals with reforms that involve multiple ministries and arbitrates when a disagreement arises, especially when agencies’ fundamental mandate may be adversely affected by a regulatory change.

Creating a new coordinating agency or reform unit may not make sense everywhere. In New Zealand, where the population size and the share of public workers are comparatively small, the government appoints key actors to carry out the policy objectives that require cross-agency coordination. In the case of the one-stop online shop for all government advice and support to business – which was part of the BPS program – the government appointed a lead minister (Minister for Economic Development) as well as a lead agency (Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment) to coordinate and champion the reform effort across a myriad of government agencies, from customs to inland revenue.

Singapore is another good example of a country that was able to put the private sector at the center of its business reform policy-setting agenda without having to create a new institutional body. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) coordinates the *Ease of Doing Business* agenda, monitoring the country's performance across the *Doing Business* indicator set and working closely with the relevant lead agencies it nominates and monitors (e.g. the Building and Construction Authority is the lead agency for Construction Permits). To actively engage the private sector, the Pro-Enterprise Panel which is part of MTI, lends a voice to the private sector. Businesses can report regulatory issues they face through the panel's hotline and website, or through the Singapore Business Federation. Complaints are then reviewed by a panel within MTI which includes private sector representatives. For the serious cases identified, regulatory agencies are required to provide a proposal to address the issue within a two-week time-frame. Ultimately, the panel's strategy is not to mandate the agencies, but to find mutually beneficial solutions and build consensus by facilitating an inclusive dialogue.

### Creating institutional mechanisms through new set-ups.

Other countries have created new institutions to drive the business reform agenda and spur public private dialogue – in the hope that it gives rise to a shared purpose and increases collaboration among stakeholders.<sup>39</sup> Malaysia did this by creating the abovementioned PEMUDAH and PEMANDU.<sup>40</sup> The Malaysian government also established the Malaysia Productivity Corporation (MPC) in 2008, which is the nation's lead agency for productivity and competitiveness issues. Housed in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), MPC works with both private and public stakeholders for advancing the national competitiveness agenda through training, advisory services, and policy recommendations. MPC's research teams produce economic data on Malaysian productivity and monitor the country's performance in the global competitiveness indices.

Some countries have created public-private competitiveness councils to formulate reform proposals and promote their implementation. Korea established from 2008 to 2013 the Presidential Council on Competitiveness (PCNC) to advise the government on regulatory reform, innovation, and other policy matters affecting the private sector. This public-private body included ministers and heads of government research agencies, private sector representatives, and members of civil society such as labor representatives, and academics. Its responsibilities included identifying reform priorities, preparing an implementation roadmap, and helping coordinate implementation. To strengthen the interaction between the PCNC and the private sector and accelerate reforms, the Public-Private Regulatory Reform Task Force was established and placed under the supervision of the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) and the PCNC. The task force played an important role in identifying burdensome regulations through consultations with businesses and formulating concrete reform proposals in collaboration with relevant government entities.<sup>41</sup>

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39) Pfeiffer, Caryn, 2012. Reform Coalitions: Patterns and hypothesis from a Survey of the Literature. Developmental Leadership Program.

40) PEMUDAH, a special task force to facilitate business, and PEMANDU, a dedicated delivery unit were created in 2009. PEMANDU, which was first hosted at the Prime Minister's office, deals government service delivery improvement and the structural transformation of the economy. Its main role is to move quickly from strategy to an implementable plan. PEMUDAH, on the other hand, helps identify and remove constraints to businesses through dialogue with the private sector. PEMUDAH and PEMANDU represent two very different styles of public-private collaboration.

41) Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 2011. Public-Private Deregulatory Taskforce Troubleshooting Problems on Every Aspect of Business.

The UAE is another example of a country that created new institutions to promote its business reform plan. The Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority (FCSA) was founded in 2015 as a federal government authority with three objectives: 1) deliver national statistics 2) monitor and advise the government on the country's competitiveness 3) implement the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The three areas complement each other and ensure a whole-of-government approach. FCSA works actively with Ministries and acts as a convener when it comes to cross-sectoral projects. On the *Doing Business* report, a dedicated team from FCSA monitors the report, analyzes it, and provides recommendations to relevant government bodies on reforms to enhance competitiveness. To engage the private sector, FCSA launched in 2018 the Private Sector Advisory Council. The body engages private companies through consultations, the outcomes of which are summarized into potential policy implications. Consultations are held on a wide spectrum of issues, including gender equality to boost low female labor force participation rate by eliminating obstacles women face at the workplace.

## CONCLUSION

There is no one-size fits all approach to organizing for a successful program to reform the business environment. And while countries do not always get it right the first time, in the end, strong institutional mechanisms are what allows to sustain reform implementation and shape public officials' incentives.

The leadership, scope, institutional structures, monitoring mechanisms and engagement with the private sector vary across countries. However, successful reformers share common characteristics including strong commitment at the highest levels, a long-term vision, effective coordination mechanisms, as well as an involvement of the private sector in the reform process. Roadmaps, with specific actions, deadlines, and responsibilities, form the basis for monitoring reform progress and accountability. Countries missing some of these features have shown difficulties in starting or sustaining reforms.

Defining the specific institutional mechanisms and reporting structures depends on the country context, as does their degree of inclusiveness, institutionalization, and accountability. Nonetheless, the examples in this note illustrate how governments have organized multi-tiered structures, with various levels of sophistication and involvement of the private sector to effectively coordinate reforms that span multiple agencies and ensure adequate monitoring systems. These governments had a long-term objective to promote private-sector led growth.

Additional research is needed to shed light on the types of mechanisms most effective in initiating and sustaining business environment reforms. It would be particularly valuable to understand how country context shapes high-level oversight, ad-hoc committees or working groups, coordinating units, and public-private bodies – as well as their effectiveness.

### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

*This note was prepared by Zenaida Hernandez Uriz, Lucas Menut and Jean Arlet, under the supervision of Sylvia Solf. It builds on a previous note prepared with Cemile Hacibeyoglu.*

# ANNEX I.

## COUNTRY EXAMPLES

### INDIA

- *Leadership*: the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion is the lead agency in charge of the regulatory reform agenda. The DIPP reports to the office of the Prime Minister's through review meetings.
- *Long-term vision with clear goals translated into specific, measurable objectives*: Prime Minister Narendra Modi first outlined his vision in 2018 to double the size of the national economy by 2025 to \$5 trillion in GDP. One of the components of the strategy is to improve the country's regulatory framework, with *Doing Business* used as key benchmark. Indeed, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has focused on achieving a top 50 position during his tenure – a goal he first stated upon taken office in 2014.
- *Appropriate institutional mechanisms and clear accountabilities*: the department of industrial policy and promotion (DIPP) was appointed to spearhead the *Doing Business* reform agenda. DIPP, in turn, set up an institutionalized feedback process on policy reform by commissioning public-private agencies to serve as observers and collect feedback from the private sector. These observers include the Indian Institute for Foreign Trade, the Institute of Company Secretaries of India, the National Institute of Construction Management and Research (NICMAR), and the Institute of Chartered Accountants. DIPP further set up *Doing Business* indicator-specific Task Forces in 2016 composed of representatives from relevant departments, which are required to hold regular meetings with private stakeholders to gather feedback from users on the reforms being implemented.

To promote reforms at the subnational level, DIPP lays out a series of annual goals as part of its Business Reform Action Plans (BRAP). The implementation of reform actions is monitored through an online portal on which state governments upload evidence of implementation (for review and approval). Once approved, states receive an "implementation score" which allows the central government to rank states annually on reform implementation progress.

In terms of reporting, DIPP is under the umbrella of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and focuses on stimulating investments and entrepreneurship. DIPP holds regular review meetings chaired by the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretary. And on December 13, 2018, the Prime Minister himself held the first review meeting on the status of *Doing Business* reforms.

### MALAYSIA

- *Leadership*: the Prime Minister created PEMUDAHA in 2007 to improve business regulations. PEMUDAHA aims at sustaining a business-friendly environment to make Malaysia "the globally benchmarked preferred place to do business." Strong leadership at the level of the Chief Secretary to the Government of Malaysia (co-chairman of PEMUDAHA) has been critical in driving regulatory changes.
- *Long-term vision with clear goals translated into specific, measurable objectives*: The Government Transformation Plan addresses improvement of government service delivery through six National Key Result Areas. The Economic Transformation Plan seeks to increase Gross National Income per capita from US\$6,900 in 2009 to more than US\$15,000 in 2020 through a structural shift of economic activity to priority sectors called National Key Economic Areas (NKEA). Finally, the cross-cutting New Economic Model includes six strategic reform initiatives for transforming the Malaysian economy.
- *Appropriate institutional mechanisms and clear accountabilities*: PEMUDAHA coordinates a team of 14 Ministries, 10 leaders of various Malaysian businesses, and the President of the Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC). It has organized its investment climate reform process in working groups, for each *Doing Business* topic, that span different ministries, and government agencies. One of PEMUDAHA's founding principles was achieving a competitive economy based on efficient public service

delivery standards, streamlined regulations and reduced corruption – all through effective cooperation between the public and private sectors. In fact, PEMUDAH actively studied the most effective private sector methods in providing services and replicated them for public services. To reflect the private stakeholders’ concerns, 10 out of 28 of the committee’s members are representatives of the private sector (representing the heads of labor unions and chambers of commerce in Malaysia). The committee chairmanship alternates between the private and public sectors to ensure representation of the private sector’s voice in the decisions of the committee.

## MAURITIUS

- *Leadership*: the Prime Minister meets regularly with agencies in charge of promoting/implementing business reforms. Moreover, the Economic Development Board reports directly to the PM’s office (see below).
- *Long-term vision with clear goals translated into specific, measurable objectives*: improving the country’s competitiveness and improving the business climate is part of the agenda of the Government of Mauritius. The government’s vision is to position Mauritius among the top 10 in the *Doing Business* rankings.
- *Appropriate institutional mechanisms and clear accountabilities*: business environment related reforms benefit from the inputs of Business Mauritius—an umbrella organization created in 2015<sup>42</sup> representing a variety of private sector associations—which heads strong advocacy efforts vis-à-vis many institutions in Mauritius, such as the Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Mauritius Employers Federation. Business Mauritius actively contributes to policy formulation by way of various submissions to Government (e.g. survey, statistics, annual memoranda, etc.) and meets with the Prime Minister to advocate policy reform proposals.
- The Economic Development Board (EDB)<sup>43</sup> is another key institution that provides institutional support towards regulatory reforms. EDB coordinates line ministries to adopt new regulatory policies - while promoting the country as an attractive investment center. The EDB further conducts research projects and initiatives to identify key issues faced by the private sector and regulatory agencies. The EDB operates under the Prime Minister’s Office.

## NEW ZEALAND

- *Leadership*: a lead minister as well as a lead agency are appointed on a case by case basis to take charge in implementing a reform agenda. For issues related to investment promotion and competitiveness, the appointed parties are typically the Minister for Economic Development and the Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment.
- *Long-term vision with clear goals translated into specific, measurable objectives*: Under the Fifth National Government of New Zealand (2008 – 2017), the *Better Public Services* (BPS) program was introduced, which - as its names suggests – focused on improving government services. Among the 10 cross-agency objectives of the BPS was boosting e-services for businesses through targeted initiatives, including the creation of an online one-stop shop for firms. To gauge success, two desired outcomes were identified through the 2012-2017 period: (i) to reduce the business costs from dealing with the government by 25%; and (ii) align government to business services ratings with leading private sector firms’ performance.
- *Appropriate institutional mechanisms and clear accountabilities*: In New Zealand, where the population size and the share of public workers are comparatively small, the government appoints existing actors to carry out the policy objectives that require cross-agency coordination. For example, the government appointed a lead minister (Minister for Economic Development) as well as a lead agency (Ministry for

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42) Business Mauritius stems from the merger, in October 2015, of two business associations, namely the Mauritius Employers Federation and the Joint Economic Council.

43) The Economic Development Board was official created as a statutory body in January 2018 following the merger between the Board of Investment, Enterprise Mauritius and the Financial Services Promotion Agency.

Business, Innovation and Employment) to coordinate the design and implementation of the one-stop online shop for all government advice– which was part of the BPS program. The Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment in turn had to coordinate with several government agencies, from customs to inland revenue, to implement the service.

- To engage the private sector, independent associations - such as Business New Zealand – are asked to regularly weigh-in on business regulation matters to the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE), which oversees policy, regulation, and services impacting local firms. Such consultations have guided policy design. For example, after businesses complained that government services were fragmented in 2012, the government set up an online shop to provide all the advice and support business's needs.
- In terms of structure, the Business New Zealand Council is made up of representatives of four regional business organizations: EMA, Business Central, Canterbury Employers' Chamber of Commerce (CECC) and Otago-Southland Employers' Association (OSEA). These associations have been serving their member businesses for over a hundred years with legal advice, human resources and other services. This structure further gives regional presence to Business New Zealand.

## RUSSIAN FEDERATION

- *Leadership:* President Putin created in 2011 the Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI) and heads its Supervisory Board, which includes the Minister of Economic Development, the Director General of the Agency, heads of regions, the representatives of public associations, as well as leading businessmen. Among other objectives, the new agency seeks to improve the business climate and create a positive image of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship in Russia.
- *Long-term vision with clear goals translated into specific, measurable objectives:* private sector development and competitiveness figure prominently in the national development strategy and are articulated in several documents: 1) Main Directions of Operations of the Government of the Russian Federation until 2018 (approved by the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation); 2) Concept of Long-Term Social and Economic Development of the Russian Federation until 2020; 3) State Program of the Russian Federation "Economic Development and Innovative Economy"; and 4) Executive Order on Long-Term State Economic Policy of May 7, 2012 #576, signed by President Putin, which sets a target to increase Russia's ranking in the World Bank's ease of doing business index from 120th place in 2011 to 50th place in 2015 and 20th place in 2018.
- *Appropriate institutional mechanisms and clear accountabilities:* the Agency for Strategic Initiatives is an autonomous non-governmental organization. Its main functions are to (i) enhance business climate & eliminate administrative barriers, (ii) facilitate communications and cooperation between businesses and public authorities, (iii) promote entrepreneurs' views in the policy making process for business regulations, (iv) and create a positive image of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship in Russia. ASI is not formally embedded into Russia's bureaucratic hierarchy like line government agencies.

The Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation oversees the coordination of the reform agenda and is involved in day-to-day activities including operations and coordination of relations with public and private stakeholders, as well as the international organizations that offer technical assistance in this area.

The Agency for Strategic Initiatives was tasked with the implementation of the "100 Steps" Program to improve the economy-wide business climate and elevate Russia's position in the World Bank's *Doing Business* rankings from 120th place to 20th place by 2018. Within the 100 Steps context, ASI, in collaboration with Russia's leading business associations, launched the National Business Initiative and developed roadmaps to remove major administrative barriers.

ASI identified roadmap priorities and specific targets through an intensive consultation process with the business community, as well as think tanks and academia. Over 4,000 individuals, many of which business people, were engaged in consultations through an online crowdsourcing platform.

Progress reports are generated quarterly and are updated regularly, on a needs basis. All ASI roadmaps include sets of interim indicators and targets to allow effective assessment of the implementation of the agreed reform programs. The Agency reports its achievements quarterly to the Supervision Council.

All forms of communication are used on a regular basis: reports, brochures, websites, conferences, mass media, and billboards. Communication initiatives seen in the Russian Federation are technical workshops and conferences dedicated to the specific business regulation area and bringing together local and international practitioners and experts of the field. This kind of conferences not only stimulate useful peer-to-peer exchanges that result in the adoption of other countries' best practices, but they also serve to communicate to the public what the country is working on.

## RWANDA

- *Leadership* is provided by the President and Prime Minister (via Inter-Ministerial Committee/Cabinet meetings). The President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, launched Vision 2020 in 2000 and subsequently created the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) to support the private sector pillar of the vision.
- *Long-term vision with clear goals translated into specific, measurable objectives*: launched in 2000, *Vision 2020* aims to transform Rwanda from a low-income economy to a lower-middle-income economy.<sup>44</sup> *Vision 2020* identifies both short, medium and long term goals. Short term: promotion of macroeconomic stability and wealth creation to reduce aid dependency
  - » Medium Term: transforming from an agrarian to a knowledge-based economy
  - » Long Term: creating a productive middle class and fostering entrepreneurship

*Vision 2020* encompasses six pillars, one of which is private sector-led development. In the original plan laid out, each pillar had relevant KPI targets for 2010 (medium term) and 2020 (long term). The KPI targets that are relevant to the "private sector development" pillar include (but are not limited to): growth rate of the private sector (%), growth rate of the industry sector (%), growth in national investment (% of GDP). Some of these targets were subsequently adjusted in 2012 in the Revised Rwanda Vision 2020 plan.

To ensure a smooth implementation of the *Vision 2020*, a planning process was carefully laid out. Notably, aspirations were translated into programs of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) as well as the National Investment Strategy (NIS). The PRS is operationalized through medium-term sector strategies informing provincial and district development plans.<sup>45</sup>

- *Appropriate institutional mechanisms and clear accountabilities*: in 2009, Rwanda launched the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) to coordinate and promote the country's private sector led economic agenda. More particularly, RDB oversees government agencies responsible for attracting and facilitating investment. This includes the agencies responsible for business registration, investment promotion, tourism regulation, environmental clearances, and privatization.<sup>46</sup> The RDB, in turn, measures its achievements through its annual reports where KPIs include: the number of registered investments, export growth, tourism revenue, the ease of *Doing Business* standing, etc.

To ensure both independence and influence, RDB reports directly to the President and is guided by a board that includes all the key Ministers (e.g., finance, commerce, infrastructure, agriculture). Moreover, the Executive Director's position is a cabinet level position appointed by the president. RDB, therefore, meets with the Prime Minister through inter-ministerial committees and cabinet meetings. RDB also receives external support from the Singapore Development Board, the World Bank, and the IFC, among others.

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44) The objective has now been revised to 2035.

45) Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Rwanda Vision 2020. July 2000.

46) Source: Rwanda Development board.

## SINGAPORE

- *Leadership* on business regulatory issues is spearheaded by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. At the same time, the Economic Development Board, which has an advisory role, has direct access to the office of the Prime Minister.
- *Appropriate institutional mechanisms and clear accountabilities:* several institutions have been set up to help Singapore design and implement regulatory reforms:
  - i. The Pro-Entreprise Panel (PEP) actively engages the private sector to identify regulatory shortcomings and potential policy improvements. The public-private panel serves as a feedback and troubleshooting platform when new policies and public initiatives are tested and rolled out. Businesses can also report to PEP regulatory problems as well as issues relating to red tape and public service performance.
  - ii. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) coordinates the *Ease of Doing Business* agenda, monitoring the country's performance across the *Doing Business* indicator-set and working closely with the relevant lead agencies it nominates and monitors (e.g. the Building and Construction Authority is the lead agency for Construction Permits). Complaints lodged by the private sector to PEP are reviewed by a panel within MTI which includes private sector representatives. For the serious cases identified, regulatory agencies are required to provide a proposal to address the issue within a two-week time-frame. MTI also houses the Economic Development Board (EDB), which has the mandate to test new policy ideas with the business community and provide feedback on the country's competitiveness. EDB does not have any direct authority over agencies (it serves in an advisory capacity) but it has direct access to the office of the Prime Minister.
  - iii. Regular meetings between the agencies championing reforms and high-level members of the government also increase accountability. In Singapore, the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (COPS) – which is the highest non-political oversight body of the government – holds an annual meeting specifically dedicated to the ease of *Doing Business* agenda during which each agency must propose reform actions and an improvement plan. COPS is also tasked to arbitrate when a disagreement arises, especially when agencies' fundamental mandate may be adversely affected by a regulatory change.

## TURKEY

- *Leadership* is provided by the Prime Minister of Turkey, who chairs the Investment Advisory Council.
- *Long-term vision with clear goals translated into specific, measurable objectives:* in 2011, the administration of Prime Minister (now President) Recep Tayyip Erdogan launched the *Turkey 2023 Vision*. The aim of the vision is to achieve specific goals leading up to the country's centennial in 2023. The vision's goals most notably include growing the size of the economy into the top 10 globally, increasing per capita income to an average of \$25,000 and lowering unemployment below 5%. Targets are broken down by sectors, such as energy (e.g. maximize hydro power), transportation (building a three level 'Eurasia' Tunnel), tourism, agriculture, finance, education, etc. And while some of the targets laid-out look difficult to achieve given the current economic circumstances, the country's is on track to reach some of its stated goals.
- *Appropriate institutional mechanisms and clear accountabilities:* Turkey established in 2001 a high-level reform committee: YOIKK. The structure of YOIKK is made of four components:
  - i. The Investment Advisory Council (IAC): Its annual meetings are chaired by the Prime Minister and gather executives of leading multinational firms, heads of international institutions (IMF, World Bank), and heads of Turkish private sector associations (TOBB, TUSIAD, YASED, TIM, MUSIAD). IAC serves as a high-level advisory body for YOIKK: it formulates policy recommendations and assesses the progress achieved.
  - ii. YOIKK: the Coordination Council for the Improvement of Investment Environment: The YOIKK Council is chaired by the Minister of Economy. Its quarterly meetings gather participants from investment-related ministries and representatives from the private sector and civil society. The Council determines


overall reform priorities, develops action plans with timelines and responsibilities, and briefs the Council of Ministers on the progress achieved.

- iv. The Steering Committee meets at least every two months and gathers the Deputy Undersecretaries of investment-related ministries and private stakeholders. The Committee’s role is to coordinate and monitor the activities of the technical committees. It also helps in the agenda-setting process.
- v. The Secretariat of YOIKK is carried out by the Ministry of Economy in cooperation with the Investment Support and Promotion Agency of Turkey. The Secretariat prepares YOIKK meetings, Steering Committee meetings, and IAC meetings. It examines and reports the findings of international indices (WB, UNCTAD, and OECD), publishes YOIKK Action Plans, and prepares IAC Reports.
- vi. The technical committees are chaired by high-level bureaucrats. There are ten working groups: Company registration and Corporate Governance; Employment; Input Supply Strategy (GITES) and Sectoral Licensing; Land for investment, environmental and zoning permits; Taxes and Incentives; Foreign Trade and Customs, Intellectual Property Rights and R&D; Legislation on Investment Climate; Access to Finance; Infrastructure.

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)

- *Leadership* is provided by UAE’s Vice President and Prime Minister and Ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum through the cabinet of the UAE, which the National Agenda Executive Teams and the FCSA report to (see below).
- *Long-term vision with clear goals translated into specific, measurable objectives:* In 2010, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum launched *UAE Vision 2021*. The vision calls for shift from an oil dependent economy to a diversified and knowledge-based economy by the fiftieth anniversary of the UAE. One of the six priority areas of the national agenda is the “competitive knowledge economy”. The pillar focuses on boosting innovation and entrepreneurship through private sector development measures, such as a strengthening in the business regulatory framework. Notably, the UAE aims to improve on several KPIs and be among the top countries in the world on many international benchmarks, including the Global Entrepreneurial Spirit Index (GEM), the *Ease of Doing Business* Index, the Global Competitiveness Index (WEF) and the Global Innovation Index (INSEAD). Progress, in turn, is monitored through yearly reports.

### The six pillars of Vision 2021



Source: 2018 UAE Vision 2021

- *Appropriate institutional mechanisms and clear accountabilities:* several institutions have been set up to help the UAE design and implement regulatory reforms:
  - i. The National Agenda 2021 Executive Teams. These Executive teams were launched in 2016 and include 500 officials from various public agencies to accelerate the achievement of the UAE National Agenda in the 6 National Priority areas - including the Competitive Knowledge Economy pillar. In total there are 36 Executive Teams responsible for setting and monitoring the implementation of work plans that comprise of short, medium- and long-term initiatives. Some executive teams are focused on improving the performance of the UAE on selected benchmarks, such as the Executive Team for the *Ease of Doing Business* indicators. Each team is further tasked to deliver periodic reports. In terms of reporting, team leader directly reports the office of a ministry within the council of ministers of the UAE.
  - ii. The Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority (FCSA) founded in 2015 is a federal government authority that has three objectives: 1) deliver national statistics, 2) monitor and advise the government of the UAE's on matters related to competitiveness, and 3) implement the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). FCSA works actively with Ministries and often acts as a convener when it comes to cross-sectoral projects. For instance, FCSA closely monitors the results of the UAE on the *Doing Business* report, analyzes its data, and provides recommendations to relevant government bodies (including the Executive Team on *Doing Business* indicators) on the reforms that enhance UAE's policies and practices. In terms of reporting lines, the FCSA reports to the Council of Ministers (i.e. the chief executive body which includes the Prime Minister) – as reflected by the board of directors of FCSA which is composed of the Minister of Economy, the Minister of State for Financial Affairs, the Minister of Energy and Industry, etc.
  - iii. The Private Sector Advisory council (PSAC), launched in 2018 by the FCSA, PSAC engages private companies to provide their perspectives key policy actions, including SDGs implementation. PSAC's mandate is to provide public-private consultations, the outcomes of which are summarized into potential policy implications. As an example, consultations in October 2019 are to be held on Gender Equality to address relatively low female labor force participation. Members of the Private Sector Advisory Council are to convene to share the obstacles women face at the workplace – and share potential policy solutions on how to attract more women in the workplace. PSAC members include Careem, Dubai Free Zone Council, Emirates airlines, Shurooq, DP World, FAB, Dubai Holding, Masdar and Emaar.

## ANNEX II.

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